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FIELDING AN EXCELLENT TEAM:  
LAW CLERK SELECTION AND 
CHAMBERS STRUCTURE AT THE  
U.S. SUPREME COURT 
CHRISTOPHER D. KROMPHARDT* 
Supreme Court Justices exercise wide discretion when hiring law 
clerks.  The Justices are constrained only by the pool of qualified 
applicants and by norms of the institution, such as that beginning with 
Chief Justice Burger’s tenure in 1969 90% of clerks have previously 
served a clerkship with a federal judge.  Previous work finds that ideology 
structures hiring decisions at the individual clerk level; however, these 
analyses fail to account for the fact that a Justice hires several clerks each 
Term—he seeks a winning team, not just a single all-star.  Hiring 
decisions are structuring decisions in which one of a Justice’s goals is to 
assemble a team of clerks that provides him with information to aid in 
decision making.  I analyze ideological characteristics of the teams the 
Justices assembled from 1969–2007 and find that they frequently hire 
clerks with different preferences than their own.  This analysis has 
implications for the information clerks convey to their Justice and 
suggests that existing principal–agent models used to explain the Justice–
clerk relationship may be incomplete. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
All judges rely on information to help them make decisions.  
Information helps them to understand the facts and the law and to 
decide which strategy to pursue.  While unobservable psychological 
processes are what lead a judge to choose a particular strategy, scholars 
have sought to learn about the inputs to these processes.  These inputs 
include information from numerous sources, including that contained in 
litigant and amicus curiae briefs,1 debated during oral argument,2 
articulated by the solicitor general,3 and conveyed by law clerks in in-
chambers discussions.4  By studying these sources, scholars hope to learn 
how judges make decisions and, perhaps, to explain their behavior. 
There are unique challenges to studying the role of clerks as 
information sources.  First, these conversations take place in secret and 
are usually unrecorded, except in memo form.  It is also difficult to 
know what information clerks possess that their judge does not.  Finally, 
there is the challenge of disentangling the mechanism by which this 
information can influence the judge’s decision making.  
The relationship between the Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court and their law clerks provides leverage over some of these 
challenges.  Scholars have availed themselves of full lists of every law 
clerk to serve, and because these clerks often go on to be public figures, 
it is possible to collect their biographical information.5  When her 
biography differs from that of her Justice, a clerk has the advantage of 
an information asymmetry and can convey information a Justice does 
not already have.  Additionally, because we know the identity of all the 
clerks a Justice has hired, we can analyze how the information 
environment of a Justice’s chambers affects his decision making.  
 
1.  PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND 
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 75–114 (2008). 
2.  Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs, II, The Influence of Oral 
Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99 (2006). 
3.  RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT: EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFLUENCE AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
(2012); Michael A. Bailey, Brian Kamoie & Forrest Maltzman, Signals from the Tenth Justice: 
The Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court Decision Making, 49 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 72 (2005). 
4.  Christopher D. Kromphardt, U.S. Supreme Court Law Clerks as Information 
Sources and Justice Decision Making (Aug. 3, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
5.  TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND 
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 219–35 (2006).  
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Research has shown that when a team of clerks holds unified 
preferences, some teams have successfully pulled the Justice’s vote in 
their direction.6 
 While we can neither sit in on meetings between a Justice and his 
clerks nor probe his brain as he considers his strategies, we can analyze 
how he assembles the team of clerks on which he relies.  The makeup of 
these teams reveals clues about what information he seeks to aid his 
decision making.  Some Justices desire information from disparate and 
competing sources, pursuing the logic that the fruits of many minds 
often produce the best answer.7  Other Justices seek information of a 
particular ideological nature;8 this information helps justify voting in 
their preferred ideological direction and may provide ammunition for 
persuading other Justices and defusing attacks.  Studying the team a 
Justice assembles provides scholars with a rare glimpse into how he does 
his work. 
This is not the first study on clerk selection, but to my knowledge it 
is the first to treat selection as the assembly of a team rather than the 
hiring of individuals.  My subject of interest is the team a Justice 
assembles.  Specifically, I will analyze patterns in the ideological 
characteristics of the Justices’ teams from 1969–2007.  I discuss two 
theoretical perspectives on clerk hiring—one in which clerks are agents 
to the Justice as principal and one in which clerks are tapped as sources 
of information—and derive implications from each perspective that will 
facilitate interpretation of data on Justice and clerk ideological 
preferences.  These patterns reveal a great deal about the teams of 
clerks the Justices assemble to accomplish their goals.  In general, the 
analysis uncovers variance across the Justices and over the Justices’ 
tenures.9  In particular, the results undermine the notions that a Justice’s 
ideology completely determines the information he seeks and that 
clerks’ ideologies always match those of their Justices.  
This study should be of interest beyond the narrow question of how 
clerks influence their Justices.  As I mention above, the teams a Justice 
assembles provide clues about how he does his work.  Information about 
 
6.  Kromphardt, supra note 4, at 25–29. 
7.  Cf. Rick A. Swanson & Stephen L. Wasby, Good Stewards: Law Clerk Influence in 
State High Courts, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 24, 37 (2008) (reporting that “several [state high court] 
judges stated that they appreciated clerks because they sometimes provide perspectives 
unavailable to the judge”). 
8.  Cf. id. at 36. 
9.  See infra Figures 1 & 2. 
 292 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:289 
their clerks should join the Justices’ comments and released papers as 
important sources for learning about the day-to-day job of being a 
Supreme Court Justice.  The study treats Justices as performing an 
additional role.  Scholars are used to looking at Justices as role-players, 
such as members of a collegial group,10 yet are unaccustomed to treating 
them in the role of personnel managers.  Finally, the study also serves to 
illuminate a case of how elites engage in personnel management. 
II. SELECTION OF LAW CLERKS 
Clerk selection at the Supreme Court has been the subject of much 
scholarly scrutiny.  In particular, scholars have described the young 
lawyers who fill the pool from which Justices select their clerks, as well 
as the individual characteristics or criteria on which the Justices base 
hiring decisions.11  This literature contains clues about the people whom 
the Justices hire and the information those clerks have to provide. 
Insight into the motivations of students applying for federal 
clerkships is limited.12  Wasby looks at a federal appellate chambers to 
see why clerks chose that judge.13  While the results of Wasby’s survey of 
a single chambers are of limited generalizability,14 the study does 
provide valuable insight into the application process.  In particular, the 
results are suggestive of treating lower court clerks as belonging in two 
pools: those who are interested in applying to Supreme Court clerkships 
and those who are not.15  For this latter group, to which Judge 
 
10.  FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING 
LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000). 
11.  See, e.g., ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 
YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 68–108 (2006). 
12.  Very few Supreme Court clerks have only federal district court or state court 
experience.  Only 7% of Rehnquist clerks with clerkship experience had served only for a 
federal district court judge (i.e., did not also serve with a federal appellate judge) and 0.3% 
only for a state supreme court justice.  Id. at 77.  For work on other clerks, see generally Todd 
C. Peppers, Micheal W. Giles & Bridget Tainer-Parkins, Inside Judicial Chambers: How 
Federal District Court Judges Select and Use Their Law Clerks, 71 ALB. L. REV. 623 (2008) 
(district court clerks); Swanson & Wasby, supra note 7 (state supreme court clerks). 
13.  Stephen L. Wasby, “Why Clerk? What Did I Get Out of It?,” 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
411, 417–20 (2006). 
14.  This is even more so for explaining the experience of students who go on to be 
Supreme Court clerks, given that Judge Goodwin fed just two clerks.  Id. at 418.  Indeed, 
Wasby concludes that “[t]here is one reason [for applying to clerk with Judge Goodwin] that 
definitely did not apply—as a step toward a clerkship in the U.S. Supreme Court,” and even 
then, “the judge was not one of those seen as providing that connection.”  Id.  
15.  See id. 
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Goodwin’s clerks generally belong, factors like the judge’s personality, 
the Ninth Circuit—both its prestige and the issues and cases its judges 
deal with—and the Northwest geography played the biggest roles in 
why respondents applied.16  
 Several scholars have used surveys to investigate what types of 
students apply for clerkships.  In studies by Rhinehart and by Avery and 
his coauthors, the authors survey students at top schools to learn about 
their attitudes and experiences with regard to clerking.17  Rhinehart 
identifies gender gaps in why students do not seek clerkships; in 
particular, she finds that women are less likely in general to be 
interested in clerking.18  While Rhinehart’s sample size is too small to 
determine whether this difference is statistically significant, and she is 
unable to draw any firm conclusions about the experiences of racial 
minorities, this finding implies that otherwise qualified students are not 
interested in applying for clerkships and that the overall pool is not 
representative of all otherwise highly qualified young lawyers.19  If true, 
this finding has implications for the perspectives the Justices hear from 
their clerks. 
 The Avery team conducts surveys in order to gain student- and 
judge-level perspectives on the application process and to determine 
how this controversial process affects students’ attitudes toward the 
judiciary.20  The authors describe how the clerk hiring market faces a 
timing problem, where more earnest participants will inevitably 
circumvent deadlines looking to get a jump on the competition.21  
Survey responses show that students and judges alike are unsatisfied 
 
16.  See id. at 416–18. 
17. Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The Market 
for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 793, 808–12 (2001) [hereinafter Avery et 
al., The Market]; Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The 
New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 484–86 (2007) 
[hereinafter Avery et al., The New Market]; Lynn K. Rhinehart, Is There Gender Bias in the 
Judicial Law Clerk Selection Process?, 83 GEO. L.J. 575, 577–78 (1994).  Rhinehart only 
surveys students at eleven top schools who serve on the law review, Rhinehart, supra, at 578 
n.12, while Avery and his coauthors use a sampling frame that they argue is more 
representative of who receives clerkships, including fewer schools but all of these schools’ 
students, Avery et al., The Market, supra, at 808–09; Avery et al., The New Market, supra, at 
485.  No one to my knowledge has conducted a survey that reaches a broader sample of 
applicants. 
18.  Rhinehart, supra note 17, at 580. 
19.  See id.  
20.  Avery et al, The Market, supra note 17, at 795–96. 
21.  Id. at 795. 
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with the process because many participants are left having made 
suboptimal matches.22  The hectic process understandably also has the 
effect of driving students away from applying at all: 58% of respondents 
who did not apply for federal clerkships said they opted out because of 
either the nature or timing (often fall semester of their 2L year) of the 
market’s activity.23  As one student commented, “[The market] certainly 
seems like a hellish experience and that definitely contributed to my 
decision not to apply.”24  Meanwhile, the authors report that 42% of 
judges in their survey responded to a closed-ended question that a 
recommendation from professors with whom they were familiar was 
either the most or second-most important factor.25  Comments from 
student and judge respondents alike strongly suggest that faculty 
recommendations play a substantial role in the hiring process.26  These 
factors shape the body of information the Justices can glean from 
conversations with their clerks. 
 
22.  Id. at 884.  Numerous remedies to this longstanding problem have been advanced, 
from creating a common deadline, Edward R. Becker, Stephen G. Breyer & Guido Calabresi, 
The Federal Judicial Law Clerk Hiring Problem and the Modest March 1 Solution, 104 YALE 
L.J. 207, 207–08 (1994), to implementing a system modeled off the process used to match 
medical graduates with residencies, Avery et al., The Market, supra note 17, at 868–84; Avery 
et al., The New Market, supra note 17, at 452 n.25; Ernan Haruvy, Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku 
Ünver, The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and Computational 
Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market, 30 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 457 
(2006); Louis F. Oberdorfer & Michael N. Levy, On Clerkship Selection: A Reply to the Bad 
Apple, 101 YALE L.J. 1097 (1992); Patricia M. Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 3 LONG TERM 
VIEW 37 (1995), to more market based solutions, see George L. Priest, Reexamining the 
Market for Judicial Clerks and Other Assortative Matching Markets, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 123, 
124 (2005); see also Ruggero J. Aldisert, Ryan C. Kirkpatrick & James R. Stevens III, Rat 
Race: Insider Advice on Landing Judicial Clerkships, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 835 (2006). 
23.  Avery et al., The Market, supra note 17, at 829. 
24.  Id. at 894 (alteration in original).  While Avery and his coauthors largely paint a 
picture of a process whose flaws run deep, their results also show that students are strategic in 
how they manage the market.  Because many students feel obligated to accept their first offer, 
or are faced with an “exploding” offer with an expiration date, 42% in one survey and 55% in 
another reported that they narrowed the pool to whom they applied ex ante to include only 
their most-preferred judges.  Id. at 829.  Students who strongly desire a particular experience, 
be it a certain form of mentorship or to work for a feeder judge, will narrow their pools to 
include only those judges that fit the bill.  Furthermore, applicants are strategic when 
scheduling interviews to avoid receiving an exploding offer from a less desired judge.  See 
Daniel M. Katz & Derek K. Stafford, Hustle and Flow: A Social Network Analysis of the 
American Federal Judiciary, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 457, 481 (2010).  Ample evidence supports the 
conclusion that students are purposeful in selecting to whom they apply. 
25.  Avery et al., The Market, supra note 17, at 899 tbl.A11. 
26.  See id. at 900 tbl.A12. 
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 Multiple judges have written odes to what they consider the ideal 
clerk.  Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit Patricia M. Wald establishes what 
prominent feeder judges such as herself view as the stakes: “The judge–
clerk relationship is the most intense and mutually dependent one I 
know of outside of marriage, parenthood, or a love affair. . . .  [A]n 
excellent versus a mediocre team of clerks makes a huge difference in 
the judge’s daily life and in her work product.”27  As a consequence, 
many judges are not looking just for qualified clerks; they yearn 
for neophytes who can write like Learned Hand, hold their own 
in a discussion with great scholars, possess a preternatural 
maturity in judgment and instinct, are ferrets in research, will 
consistently outperform their peers in other chambers and who 
all the while will maintain a respectful, stoic, and cheerful 
demeanor.28 
On top of making the job easier and more pleasant, Wald points to 
the prestige that comes with being considered a feeder judge.29  Chief 
Judge of the Ninth Circuit Alex Kozinski, who like Wald is a feeder 
judge and a former court of appeals—and Supreme Court—clerk agrees 
that “judges have a very substantial stake in selecting clerks who are not 
merely competent, but brilliant; not merely articulate, but lightning fast 
and prolific; not merely thoughtful, but persuasive and tactful”;30 to 
identify such clerks, he attributes “the type of drive and 
determination—as well as imperviousness to pain—[that] many judges 
look for in a clerk” to being successful in the classroom, publishing a 
note, doing research, or showing proficiency as a successful moot court 
advocate.31 
 The foregoing studies reveal a great deal about the pool from which 
Justices hire their clerks.  They show that clerks in their application and 
acceptance and Justices in their offering decisions act purposefully; the 
pool is not filled at random, so to speak.  These processes contribute to 
two bifurcations: feeder and non-feeder judges,32 and feeder and non-
 
27.  Wald, supra note 22, at 37–38. 
28.  Id. at 38–39. 
29.  Id. at 39.  
30.  Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 YALE L.J. 1707, 1708 (1991). 
31.  Id. at 1710 & n.8. 
32.  See Avery et al., The Market, supra note 17, at 875–77.  Feeder judges compete for 
the top law students, and among the reasons these students choose to clerk with feeder judges 
are their prestige and their track record in placing clerks at the Supreme Court.  Id. 
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feeder clerks.33  Ideology plays a role in both feeder and non-feeder 
matches; applicants and judges alike, through conscious and unconscious 
selection, show a tendency to make ideological matches.34  And while 
the mechanism driving the disparity is uncertain, female and minority 
law students are underrepresented in all appellate clerkships.35  
 Characterizing the pool of individuals with appellate clerkship 
experience is essential because, in recent years, having this experience 
has become a norm and virtual requirement to be selected for a 
Supreme Court clerkship.  The genesis of this practice is attributed to a 
preference by Chief Justice Warren Burger that soon caught on with the 
rest of the Justices.36  During the years of the Burger Court, the 
percentage of clerks with prior clerkship experience increased from 68% 
to 95%,37 and 85% of these clerks with experience had acquired it with a 
federal appellate judge.38  This trend grew even more pronounced in the 
Rehnquist Court, with 98% of all clerks having experience and 92% of 
that subset gaining it with federal appellate judges.39  The norm has 
become near law in the Roberts Court: through the 2013 Term, only two 
clerks did not first gain experience in one of the twelve regional circuits 
 
33.  See Wasby, supra note 13, at 418.  Nelson and his coauthors discuss how an 
increasing number of law students appear to be following an ideological track that continues 
after their clerking days are over.  William E. Nelson, Harvey Rishikof, I. Scott Messinger & 
Michael Jo, The Liberal Tradition of the Supreme Court Clerkship: Its Rise, Fall, and 
Reincarnation?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1749, 1797–98 (2009) (“A law student who self-identifies 
as a conservative by, for example, joining the Federalist Society can take the next step 
forward by clerking for a conservative federal circuit judge, moving on to a conservative 
Supreme Court clerkship, next serving in a conservative Justice Department, and finally 
becoming a litigator in a conservative practice group.  After two decades in such a career, a 
smart lawyer will be fully prepared to be appointed to the bench as a reliably conservative 
judge or Justice.”). 
34.  See Corey Ditslear & Lawrence Baum, Selection of Law Clerks and Polarization in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 63 J. POL. 869, 871 (2001).  Cf. Panel Discussion, Judges’ Perspectives 
on Law Clerk Hiring, Utilization, and Influence, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 463 (2014) (Judge 
Diane Sykes speculating about ideological self-selection by clerkship applicants).  A 
published conversation between Chief Judge Kozinski and one of his former clerks discusses 
the phenomenon of judges hiring non-matches.  Alex Kozinski & Fred Bernstein, Clerkship 
Politics, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 57 (1998).  The dynamic between a conservative jurist and liberal 
clerk will provide fodder for dramatization in a play called The Originalist about Justice 
Antonin Scalia.  Peter Mark, Arena Stage Finds Material Nearby: Scalia, WASH. POST, Feb. 
27, 2014, at C1. 
35.  See PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 20–23. 
36.  Id. at 31. 
37.  Id.   
38.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 11, at 77. 
39.  Id.; see also PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 31. 
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of the federal courts of appeals, although both had served clerkships in 
the federal judiciary—one in the Federal Circuit and one in the D.C. 
District Court. 
 The use of feeder judges structures ideological hiring of clerks by the 
Justices.40  Baum and Ditslear find that, “[c]ompared with the random 
distributions, many more judges actually provided no clerks to the 
justices, and some judges provided more clerks to the justices than any 
judge would have sent under a random distribution”;41 in other words, 
hiring is disproportionately concentrated among a handful of feeder 
judges.  They further observe that “it appears that liberal and 
conservative justices were drawing clerks largely from different sets of 
feeders, sets structured by the ideological positions of the feeder 
judges.”42 
 The evidence that many recent clerk hires were ideological matches 
is strong.  Baum and Ditslear report robust and statistically significant 
correlations between multiple measures of the ideologies of Justices and 
judges for the period 1995–2004.43  However, their results reveal 
considerable variance across correlations, making it difficult to assert 
with confidence precisely how strong the relationship is.44  This difficulty 
is corroborated by the often substantial gaps between clerk and Justice 
ideologies that I report later.45 
There are three possible explanations for this phenomenon.  The 
first is measurement error.  At least some measurement error should be 
 
40.  Lawrence Baum & Corey Ditslear, Supreme Court Clerkships and “Feeder” Judges, 
31 JUST. SYS. J. 26, 37–38 (2010).  Other factors that appear to affect clerk hiring are the 
overrepresentation of elite schools, PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 23; WARD & WEIDEN, supra 
note 11, at 69, and, as suggested by the underrepresentation of female and minority clerks 
discussed earlier, gender and race, PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 20–23; WARD & WEIDEN, supra 
note 11, at 87–98; Mark R. Brown, Gender Discrimination in the Supreme Court’s Clerkship 
Selection Process, 75 OR. L. REV. 359 (1996). 
41.  Baum & Ditslear, supra note 40, at 31. 
42.  Id. at 38.  In an earlier paper where the authors introduce the idea that lower court 
judge ideology signals information to the Justices, they find that ideological polarization, as 
measured by the tendency of conservative (liberal) Justices to hire clerks from judges 
appointed by Republican (Democrat) presidents, has increased in modern times: “In choosing 
clerks, the justices now give much more weight to an ideological signal than they did in the 
1970s and the 1980s.”  Ditslear & Baum, supra note 34, at 882–83.  
43.  Baum & Ditslear, supra note 40, at 38 tbl.4. 
44.  Id.  
45.  See infra text accompanying notes 74–76 and Figures 1 & 2.  
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expected, as ideology is a notoriously tricky concept to measure.46  
Another explanation is that when a Justice hires an ideological non-
match it is the result of a mistake.  The existence of selection 
committees, feeder judges, and a large number of qualified applicants 
across the ideological spectrum makes this explanation less plausible.  
Certainly there are enough qualified clerks with judges of known 
ideology that if Justices were only interested in hiring ideological 
matches, they would be capable of doing so.47  The third explanation is 
that Justices sometimes hire ideological non-matches on purpose.48  
Substantial anecdotal evidence suggests that this third possibility—that 
Justices may purposefully hire clerks whose ideological preferences are 
different from their own—does indeed take place,49 although systematic 
work has made only fleeting reference to it50 and has never explicitly 
tested how it affects decision making.51 
 In the next section, I link these observations about the role of 
clerk ideology in hiring to two perspectives on clerk selection.  These 
perspectives consider the roles clerks play and how the team of clerks a 
Justice hires suggests which role he prioritizes. 
III. TWO PERSPECTIVES ON CHAMBERS STRUCTURE 
This study is the first to describe empirically how Supreme Court 
 
46.  See Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What is Judicial Ideology, and How Should 
We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 135–36 (2009). 
47.  For a discussion of the benefits of having clerks who disagree with you, see Kozinski 
& Bernstein, supra note 34, at 62–63. 
48.  The placement records of feeder judges Douglas Ginsburg and J. Harvie Wilkinson 
may support this third explanation, although the possibility remains that liberal Justices hire 
from Judge Ginsburg for non-ideological reasons, such as reputation for hiring hard workers.  
Judge Ginsburg is very conservative and Judge Wilkinson less so, but both have placed clerks 
across the ideological range of Justices.  See Baum & Ditslear, supra note 40, at 39 tbl.5. 
49.  Kromphardt, supra note 4, at 12. 
50.  See Sally J. Kenney, Puppeteers or Agents? What Lazarus’s Closed Chambers Adds 
to Our Understanding of Law Clerks at the U.S. Supreme Court, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 185, 
194 (2000) (citing WILLIAM O DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939–1975, at 175 (1980)); 
Ryan C. Black & Christina L. Boyd, The Role of Law Clerks in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Agenda-Setting Process, 40 AM. POL. RES. 147, 169 n.3 (2012). 
51.  An important exception is a study by Peppers and Zorn, who test the effect of 
chambers structure—how many Democrats a Justice employs, for example—on the direction 
of a Justice’s vote.  Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme 
Court Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51, 74–75 (2008).  
The authors identify several mechanisms through which clerk ideology can influence a 
Justice’s vote, but cannot draw any conclusions about the mechanism driving their findings.  
Id. at 75. 
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Justices take clerks’ ideological positions into account when assembling 
teams.  
There are two perspectives that deal with the concept that I use to 
characterize these teams, which I call “chambers structure,” or the 
particular arrangement of clerks’ preferences with respect to each other 
and their Justice.  I discuss these perspectives in this section, including 
implications that I will rely on in the following section to identify and 
make sense of patterns in a set of data. 
Structural decisions are closely related to clerk selection.52  Selection 
is both interesting and important, but the literature tends to treat the 
individual hiring decisions as if they are independent of one another, a 
choice a Justice makes a few times each Term.53  However, a Justice 
does not hire his clerks in isolation of each other; rather, he hires a team 
of clerks in order to create a particular fit.  The quality of this fit is 
determined by how his clerks help him pursue his goals. 
These selection studies have shown that it is not controversial to 
assert that ideology has an important function in the decision to hire a 
clerk.54  Typically, the interpretation of the results has been that the 
Justices at least attempt to make ideological matches.55  However, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that for at least ten recent Justices, hiring 
decisions were purposefully also a function of the ideological positions 
of the other clerks who were hired.56  These Justices profess to have the 
whole chambers structure in mind, not just individual clerks’ 
characteristics.57  These anecdotes point to hiring decisions also being 
structural decisions. 
The first perspective on structural decisions treats the Justice–clerk 
relationship as an example of a principal–agent dynamic.  The 
principal–agent perspective is very common in clerk studies.58  These 
 
52.  See generally PEPPERS, supra note 5; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 11; Baum & 
Ditslear, supra note 40, at 31; Ditslear & Baum, supra note 34, at 882; Peppers & Zorn, supra 
note 51, at 75–76. 
53.  See PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 10; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 11, at 68–107; 
Baum & Ditslear, supra note 40, at 33; Ditslear & Baum, supra note 34, at 882; Peppers & 
Zorn, supra note 51, at 75–76. 
54.  Baum & Ditslear, supra note 40, at 38; Ditslear & Baum, supra note 34, at 871. 
55.  E.g., PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 32; Ditslear & Baum, supra note 34, at 882–83. 
56.  See Kromphardt, supra note 4, at 12. 
57.  See id. 
58.  PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 10; Black & Boyd, supra note 50, at 150; Ditslear & Baum, 
supra note 34, at 870; Sally J. Kenney, Beyond Principals and Agents: Seeing Courts as 
Organizations by Comparing Référendaires at the European Court of Justice and Law Clerks 
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studies assume that the Justice–clerk relationship is a classic example of 
a principal–agent relationship.59  This theory predicts that the principal 
can reduce the costs of monitoring and the risk of shirking by hiring 
agents he believes share his goals.60  According to this perspective, we 
should expect that clerk viewpoints do not diverge greatly from the 
Justice’s, because the Justice seeks clerks whose preferences closely 
match his own.61 
We can also learn what kind of information a Justice receives from a 
chambers structure in which clerks’ ideal points are unified and lie close 
to the Justice’s.  In this environment, it is unlikely that the Justice will 
receive information that supports a position dramatically different from 
his own.  Because of this, a Justice who creates this sort of structure 
probably wishes to reinforce the views he already holds. 
This discussion suggests the following implications: If we observe 
little divergence between clerk and Justice ideological positions 
 • the Justice’s hiring behavior is consistent with principal–agent 
theory; and 
 • the information asymmetry held by clerks is likely small, and any 
learning that takes place will serve primarily to reinforce the 
Justice’s current ideological position. 
The second perspective treats clerks as advisors.  At least ten Justices in 
the past forty-five years have discussed using their clerks as advisors, 
tapping them for information about the case at hand.62  This perspective 
reasons that clerks are well-trained young lawyers who are incentivized 
to be good confidants to their Justice.  As a result, clerks both possess 
useful information and are encouraged to share that information 
forthrightly. 
Clerks have had different life experiences than their Justice, such as 
those acquired perceiving the world through an ideological frame or as 
 
at the U.S. Supreme Court, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 593 (2000); Peppers & Zorn, supra note 51, 
at 58; Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Ghostwriting: Authorship on the 
Supreme Court, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1307, 1310 (2011); Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. 
Spriggs II & Lee Sigelman, Ghostwriters on the Court? A Stylistic Analysis of U.S. Supreme 
Court Opinion Drafts, 30 AM. POL. RES. 166, 173 (2002). 
59.  Ditslear & Baum, supra note 34, at 870; see also Wahlbeck et al., supra note 58, at 
173.  
60.  Ditslear & Baum, supra note 34, at 870–71. 
61.  Id. at 871. 
62.  Kromphardt, supra note 4, at 9–13. 
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member of a minority group.  Information based on those distinct 
experiences creates an information asymmetry between clerk and 
Justice and thus the opportunity for learning by the Justice.  The Justice 
learns in two ways.  The first is that by tapping his clerks as sounding-
boards he increases his overall supply of information, which he can draw 
upon when reasoning about voting strategies.63  The second way a 
Justice can learn is by filtering ideological arguments through his clerks, 
gleaning information about a strategy’s utility by comparing a clerk’s 
attitude toward it with her known biases.64 
Depending on the information he seeks, the advisory role can create 
reasons for a Justice to make structural decisions with a greater eye 
toward viewpoint diversity.  In the next section, I discuss how structure 
affects information transmission.65  Meanwhile, the present discussion 
suggests the following implications: If we observe divergence between 
clerk and Justice ideological positions 
 • the Justice faces a greater need to implement monitoring in order 
to prevent shirking; 
 • the information asymmetry held by clerks may be large, and the 
Justice can learn a great deal by discussing cases with his clerks 
(learning from his clerks may cause an observable change in the 
Justice’s behavior); and 
 • factors that impede the transmission of information from clerks to 
their Justice will affect the Justice’s ability to learn. 
While the implications suggested by the agent and advisor perspectives 
are not the same, it is imperative to note that the agent and advisor roles 
are not mutually exclusive; in all likelihood, every Justice will seek the 
benefits of both roles and, to some degree, hire clerks intending to use 
them as both agents and advisors.  One reason to conduct the empirical 
inquiry I discuss below is to evaluate the applicability of each 
perspective, both in general and in the context of individual Justices’ 
structuring practices.  This is an important exercise because it reveals 
the environment each Justice creates in which to interact with his clerks.  
By characterizing how Justices go about the delicate task of turning to 
 
63.  Id. at 3–4; cf. Panel Discussion, supra note 34, at 464 (comment by Justice David 
Stras expressing his desire for clerks with diverse backgrounds). 
64.  See Randall L. Calvert, The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model 
of Political Advice, 47 J. POL. 530, 542–43 (1985). 
65.  See infra Part III.A. 
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their clerks for aid with their work, we learn about how each individual 
approaches the job of being a Supreme Court Justice. 
A. Structure Types and Information Transmission 
Chambers structure—the particular arrangement of clerks’ 
preferences with respect to each other and their Justice—is important 
because it affects the impact clerks have on the Justice’s work.  From the 
principal–agent perspective, a structure in which clerks’ preferences 
diverge from the Justice’s means that, unless the Justice engages in 
monitoring, which can be costly, clerks can shirk from their assigned 
tasks and pursue their own preferences.66 
Structure is also one of the factors that can impede the transmission 
of information alluded to in the third implication of the advisor 
perspective.  This is because structure determines the type of 
information and affects how it is transmitted from clerks to Justice.  For 
example, clerks with broadly similar ideological preferences can convey 
information consistent with those preferences without interference; in 
other words, they can transmit a clear signal to their Justice.  The 
process is different when clerk preferences are dissimilar and multiple 
signals are sent.  These signals can conflict with each other ideologically, 
and the resulting mixed signals make it difficult to predict what the 
Justice learns.  The content of these signals comes from any information 
asymmetry between the Justice and his clerks.  Such information can 
come from several places, whether through experience perceiving the 
world through an ideological frame or as a member of a minority group, 
through research, or through amicus curiae briefs. 
This transmission of signals can be made clearer with a theoretical 
model in which a Justice’s chambers consists of two blocs: one composed 
of all clerks who are to the Justice’s ideological left and one with all 
those clerks to his right.  A model of chambers structure such as this can 
be used to specify the conditions under which signals can influence 
Justice behavior when they trigger Justice learning about the case at 
hand.  When clerks are in the same bloc, a single signal is sent, and the 
Justice can easily learn about the bloc’s position.  However, when clerks 
are in both blocs and they send multiple, ideologically conflicting 
signals, the learning process becomes more complicated. 
This bloc model is a useful tool for categorizing each Justice’s 
 
66.  PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 11–12. 
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chambers based upon its information environment.  Some Justices, 
including Lewis Powell, desired a sort of information free-for-all in 
which multiple perspectives competed.67  This sort of environment 
would lead to the accumulation of lots of information.  A Justice would 
also be able to learn by using his clerks as ideological filters in the 
manner described earlier.  I refer to this sort of chambers as a 
“crosswinds,” and it occurs when clerks are in both blocs.  Other 
Justices, for example Clarence Thomas, seem to seek a narrower flow of 
information that is consistent with a uniform set of preferences.68  The 
learning that results from acquiring this information reinforces a 
particular ideological leaning by strengthening the evidentiary base.  
These chambers I call “foxholes,” and they occur when clerks are in only 
one bloc.  For example, a conservative foxhole is one in which no clerks 
lie to the Justice’s ideological left. 
We suspect that these chambers structures exist because the Justices 
and their clerks say they do.  By analyzing empirical data we can 
describe the extent to which these chambers actually occur. 
The agent and advisor perspectives outlined above will help to make 
sense of these patterns.  While the bullet-pointed generalizations do not 
rise to the level of causal hypotheses, they will help to guide my 
interpretation of the data and to evaluate the validity of the agent and 
advisor perspectives on clerk selection. 
IV. DATA AND ANALYSIS 
Figures 1 and 2 plot each Justice’s Judicial Common Space (JCS) 
scores for the period 1969–2007.69  These scores are derived from the 
Justices’ votes on the merits and are calculated for each Term.70  This 
dynamic feature allows for an approximate visualization of a Justice’s 
trending ideology over time. 
I also plot clerks’ ideological positions with a proxy measure derived 
from their lower court clerkship experience.71  To do this I position each 
 
67.  See id. at 186.  
68.  See id. at 200.  
69.  See infra Figures 1 & 2.  See generally Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. 
Segal & Chad Westerland, The Judicial Common Space, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007). 
70.  See Epstein et al., supra note 69, at 306–09.  
71.  I assign each clerk the JCS score of the court of appeals judge for whom she 
previously clerked.  This measure performs well under convergent and construct validation 
and is theoretically valid because applicants and judges select on ideology.  Kromphardt, 
supra note 4, at 20–21. 
 304 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:289 
clerk in the correct bloc based on whether her JCS score is higher or 
lower than the Justice’s and plot the average JCS score for all clerks in 
each bloc.  This measurement strategy allows bloc and Justice ideologies 
to be situated ordinally and gives a sense of how they relate to each 
other.  
The solid black line running through the middle of each pane 
connects a Justice’s JCS scores across Terms.72  The points in red above 
this solid line depict the average ideology score of all clerks in the right 
bloc for that Term.  The points in blue below the line depict the same 
for clerks in the left bloc.  The physical size of these points varies based 
on the proportion of clerks in the bloc: larger points are reflective of 
more clerks.  Blocs with no clerks are omitted from the figure.73 
The figures enable identification of the different types of chambers 
discussed in the previous section.  A crosswinds chambers is identifiable 
when there is a red point directly above and a blue point directly below 
a Justice’s point (in other words, when a straight line can be drawn 
through a red dot, a Justice’s black dot, and a blue dot for a single 
Term).  As the figure shows, in 2007, Justice Samuel Alito had a 
crosswinds chambers.  A foxhole chambers is identifiable when there is 
only a red or blue dot but not both, as Justice Alito had in 2006.  
To my knowledge, no study has attempted to describe the structural 
decisions the Justices make.  I will draw some general conclusions from 
these data that constitute the first findings about the important 
structural decisions the Justices make. 
 
  
 
72.  Scores are lagged by one year and capture a Justice’s ideological position during the 
period when he hired his clerks.  See Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd 
Peppers, Research Note, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection 
Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 630 (2001).  Because this strategy eliminates freshman Terms, I 
plot a Justice’s JCS score from his previous position when applicable.  For example, Chief 
Justice John Roberts’s ideology score for 2005, his first Term on the Court, is his JCS score 
from his tenure on the D.C. Circuit. 
73.  I omit Justices Hugo Black and William Douglas, who never met the coding criteria 
of having had at least two clerks with court of appeals experience, from the figures and Justice 
John Harlan II, who met it only once. 
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F
igure 2 
Justice and B
log Ideological Scores from
 1969–2007 
B
loc scores are the average of all clerks in that bloc.  L
eft B
loc scores are depicted in the blue and fall below
 the solid black line, and R
ight 
B
loc clerks are in red and above it.  T
he size of a point increases as the proportion of the cham
bers’ clerks in that bloc increases. 
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One of the most striking things about the figures is the presence of 
gaps between the ideologies of Justices and blocs.  In other words, the 
distance between Justice and bloc ideologies is often quite great.  While 
the nature of the data—JCS scores, while continuous, are ordinal—do 
not permit completely precise descriptions of this distance, it is clear 
that at times the blocs and the Justice are not ideological matches.74  
This goes against the prediction of principal–agent theory that the 
principal will hire agents that hold preferences similar to his own.75  
These gaps are surprising because divergence between a Justice and his 
clerks creates an opportunity for clerks to affect the output of a Justice’s 
chambers.  Yet we can clearly see in the data that there are often 
substantial gaps between Justice and bloc ideologies.76 
It is important to note that some of these Justice–bloc distances are a 
function of ideological extremeness.  According to the data, it would be 
impossible for a Justice whose JCS score approaches the poles to hire 
ideological matches, much less clerks that have a more extreme 
ideological rank.  This is due to the sample of ideology scores for the 
pool of courts of appeals judges.  The most liberal and conservative JCS 
scores of courts of appeals judges who fed at least one clerk in the 
period 1969–2007 are -0.65 and 0.56, respectively.  In the same time 
period, Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stevens had more 
liberal JCS scores than -0.65, and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Scalia and Thomas had conservative scores surpassing 0.56. 
For less extreme Justices who do not face this problem, why might 
they not be concerned with hiring ideological matches?  One 
explanation is that the Justices who do so seek to obtain information 
from their clerks that aids in learning about which strategy to pursue.  
These data cannot tell us for certain why Justices make these hires, but 
future work should try to explain this curious pattern. 
Also noteworthy is how bloc scores spike, or vary, over time.  For 
example, over the period 1982–1985, Justice O’Connor’s own score 
remained fairly constant while the average scores of her left bloc clerks 
 
74.  I do not measure any actual distance between the points.  Rather, I use the words 
“distance” and “gap” here to represent what are essentially different ranks.  See Daniel E. Ho 
& Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes: Misconceptions, Measurement, and 
Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 831 (2010). 
75.  See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
76.  See supra Figures 1 & 2.  It is also worth noting that because the bloc scores are 
averages they understate the distance some individual clerks lie from a Justice. 
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were -0.014, -0.53, 0.217, and -0.41.77  Other Justices, including Powell, 
Souter, Stevens, and White, at times show more attenuated spikes in 
bloc scores while maintaining constant, moderate scores of their own.78  
According to the theory, these spikes would lead to the Justice’s 
receiving different types of information from Term to Term.  Any effect 
of such spikes may be amplified by some of these Justices’ status as 
frequent swing-vote casters.79  This behavior can be contrasted with that 
of another swing-vote Justice, Anthony Kennedy.80  After some initial 
fluctuation, Justice Kennedy shows remarkable consistency in his right 
bloc scores.81  From 1996–2005, his right bloc scores fell within the 
narrow range 0.33–0.46.82  Furthermore, in nearly all of these Terms 
Justice Kennedy had assembled a foxhole chambers, which meant there 
was not a liberal signal being sent to balance what may have been an 
extremely conservative signal. 
Table 1 lists the number of times individual Justices elected to 
assemble a foxhole chambers when their JCS scores fell within a 
moderate range of scores.  I limit the table to a moderate range—
-.35 < j < .35—due to the problem of ascribing purpose to structural 
decisions made by the sample of ideologically extreme Justices.  Some 
Justices on this list are surprising—two of Justice Scalia’s earlier Terms 
qualified him as moderate, while Justice Rehnquist had seven such 
Terms toward the end of his career.83  I am less concerned with the 
validity of whether these Justices really were “moderate” than with 
distinguishing those Justices and Terms for which we might properly say 
their structural decisions were purposeful.  This subset of ideological 
values is well within the sample of feeder judge scores and suits this 
purpose. 
 
77.  See supra Figure 1. 
78.  See supra Figure 2.  
79.  In 5–4 decisions, Justice O’Connor cast the swing vote 23.7% of the time.  Peter K. 
Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The Swing Justice, 75 J. POL. 1089, 1095 fig.1 (2013).  Justice 
Powell cast such votes 23.3% of the time, Justice Souter 4.7%, Justice Stevens 10.9%, and 
Justice White 23.8%.  Id. 
80.  See id. 
81.  See supra Figure 1. 
82.  I find that this streak has consequences: the probability a moderate Justice with 
clerks who are all more conservative than he is casts a liberal vote decreases as the average 
score of those clerks moves further away from the Justice’s score.  Kromphardt, supra note 4, 
at 27–29.  Justice Kennedy assembled more of these chambers than any of his colleagues from 
1985–2001.  He also cast the swing vote in 28.3% of 5–4 decisions.  Enns & Wohlfarth, supra 
note 79, at 1095 fig.1. 
83.  See supra Table 1. 
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Not surprisingly, the vast majority of chambers in general are 
crosswinds.  When making structural decisions, the Justices seem to 
desire more information in the form of more signals from their clerks.  If 
we wish to consider when structural decisions were arguably the most 
purposeful, it is helpful to look at those Justices who made these 
decisions several times.  It may take several tries before a Justice settles 
on what sort of structure he prefers.  Of the Justices in this sample who 
faced the decision at least five times, Justice Stewart assembled foxholes 
the highest percentage of times at 57%, followed by Justices Powell, 
Stevens, and White.84  Interestingly, all but two of the foxholes 
assembled by these four Justices were composed of clerks who were 
more liberal than they were.  The Justices seem more comfortable 
making the decision to hire all more liberal clerks than all more 
conservative ones.  That all-conservative chambers have been 
demonstrated to pull their Justice’s votes on the merits in a conservative 
direction85 may not be a coincidence: the Justices may be aware (or 
learn) of such a risk and avoid it. 
Table 1 
The number of foxhole chambers assembled by a Justice out of the total Terms in which he or 
she had a moderate JCS score and at least two clerks with court of appeals experience.  
 
84.  The Justice who assembled the lowest percentage of foxholes (and therefore the 
highest percentage of crosswinds) was Justice Souter at a mere 11%, followed by Justices 
Blackmun, Burger, and O’Connor. 
85.  Kromphardt, supra note 4, at 27. 
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V. DISCUSSION 
What does the foregoing analysis tell us about what constitutes an 
excellent team for most Supreme Court Justices?  For more moderate 
Justices, the answer is clear: a team of clerks that sends more signals is 
to be preferred.  The learning that takes place after receiving these 
signals is difficult to predict, and there are exceptions to this trend, but a 
Justice is unlikely to assemble repeatedly a team of all conservative 
clerks. 
The results also raise questions about the assumption that the 
Justice–clerk relationship can be completely explained using principal–
agent theory.  The data reveal divergence between Justice and clerk 
ideologies, which, coupled with the extent to which the Justices defer to 
their clerks, suggests at least one of two things is at work.  The Justices 
who hire divergent clerks may implement monitoring to prevent 
shirking on delegated tasks.  These Justices may also find the risk of 
defiance tolerable in the face of the information benefits these clerks 
provide.  To the extent that the latter is true, scholars need to draw from 
a broader theoretical toolbox to explain the role of law clerks at the 
Supreme Court.  The advisor theory I present in this paper can be a 
useful complement to principal–agent theory. 
While this study is hopefully a stimulus for future work delving into 
the determinants and effects of the various roles clerks play, there are 
important limitations to the data and research design.  Because the data 
are ordinal and of a proxy nature, they are not appropriate for making 
precise distinctions about the distance between a Justice and his clerks.  
Ideology, while a vitally important concept, is notoriously difficult to 
measure.  Future work to refine these measures and the research design 
needs to take seriously the worthwhile challenge of capturing how clerk 
and Justice ideologies relate to each other.  Also, the research design I 
employ is purely descriptive: I have not accounted for other factors 
besides ideology that explain the decision to hire a particular clerk.  This 
decision is undoubtedly multivariate; race, gender, alma mater, feeder 
judge, and other personal factors undoubtedly play a role.  Going 
forward, research designs should seek to eliminate any systematic factor 
associated with the error term. 
Their limitations and tentative nature aside, the results I report here 
pose a number of exciting puzzles.  Are conservative clerks really more 
effective at influencing the Justices, and if so, what are the consequences 
and how have the Justices reacted?  When is a Justice willing to accept 
fewer signals, and therefore less information that could prove useful, 
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from his clerks?  Is information obtained from these signals privileged 
compared to other forms, such as that obtained through oral arguments 
and amicus curiae briefs?  Why do some moderate Justices, like 
Anthony Kennedy, who arguably have less of an ideological dimension 
to their voting behavior, nonetheless appear to follow an ideological 
dimension in their clerk hiring? 
When we see a Justice as a manager and his clerks as a team (or 
teams), the range of behavior to be explained broadens.  Better data 
collection and research designs guided by clear theoretical predictions 
will help improve our understanding of the effect law clerks have on the 
work of the Supreme Court. 
